Participation has waned, how do we rejuvenate our members and get them engaged again?
If needed we can escalate to the TC to help find new members
Maybe we need to rotate some members off if they don't have time or have lost interest, and get some new members added.
Probably worthwhile to pull together a description of the responsibilities and other criteria we're looking for... so we're clear and consistent when seeking volunteers.
The current timeslot is problematic for some folks (particularly those in Europe). Maybe we can alternate time slots each week, or find a better time that works for all.
See if they're willing and able to join us. Also to align on expectations, responsibilities, and availability.
Next week, discuss the timeslot, if needed create a doodle poll.
Today:
No objections or concerns from the team. Craig McNally will add an item to Monday's TC meeting agenda to get formal approval from them to add Jens/Kevin to the team.
We may also want to revisit the meeting date/time to see if there's a better option that works for everyone.
If/when formally approved, we will have some work to do to onboard them
Slack chat
Jira & Confluence groups
Update wiki (team composition)
Snyk access
GitHub team (?)
1 min
Cookie SameSite topic raised in Slack
Team + Zak
Production systems should be setup with SameSite = Strict or Lax
Bugfest should be setup in this way, but it's currently set to none.
Julian will continue to try to get Kitfox to move this back to Strict/Lax
Hosted reference envs, and other envs (e.g. rancher envs, etc.) which UI devs might develop against (point a local UI build at) should either:
Use SameSite = none OR
UI devs should use a proxy like NGINX (running locally)
Zak: Lax doesn't really buy us anything, we should use either none or strict. This is because stripes is an SPA. It's the backend that cares/uses the cookies, the frontend doesn't know anything about these since they're http-only cookies.
This comes up when using deep links, e.g. to other domains
Update from Zak (6/13):
WRT LOGIN_COOKIE_SAMESITE env variable in mod-login, Steve Ellis and I chatted and confirmed we could default to Strict instead of Lax without any downside.
He will create JIRAs for mod-login and mod-login-keycloak to adjust the default, and if needed we can create another story for devops if they're overriding the default for hosted reference envs.
Action: Craig McNally to touch base with Zak on progress of the Jira creation.
Some feel that the hosted reference envs should be setup like production (e.g. SAMESITE=Strict). However that interferes with UI developer's ability to point a local build of the UI at these envs.
Potential compromise: configure one of the snapshot envs to have Strict, and the other to have None.
A new PR (
STCLI-246
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Getting issue details...STATUS
, https://github.com/folio-org/stripes-cli/pull/350) introduced a proxy server to assist front-end developers with the samesite issue should they need to work against the Bugfest environment.
Action: John to try out the new functionality – check on this
Today:
John Coburn tried this out in stripes-cli and it worked well. Another developer is going to give this a go as well (Jason S.).
What are the next steps?
This is documented in the stripes-cli, but not in onboarding
We're on track here. Ian H. applied mitigation. Upgrade will happen when John Malconian returns from vacation.
Action:
Jakub Skoczen to circle back and check in with John M.
Craig posted a reminder in #devops
Check in on this next week
1 min
Jira Group and Security Level review
Team
From Craig in slack:
I've been in communication with David Crossley, Wayne Schneider, John Malconian and Peter Murray about the issue above. They apparently didn't have access to these embargoed issues (SysOps and Core Team). Peter shared this screenshot with me, which doesn't look right. I'd like to review this at one of our meetings and come up with a list of changes/improvements for Peter to make. A few ideas off the top of my head:
Add descriptions to each of the security groups, like we have for "FOLIO Security Group"
Maybe add a new security group and level for FOLIO devops
Review membership of each of these groups and remove users no longer on the project
Review the Security Level -> Group mappings. Some of these don't look quite right to me.
We need to determine if DevOps can work on
FOLIO-3896
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Getting issue details...STATUS
or if they don't have bandwidth, and the debian packages aren't used anymore, archive them. It sounds like some SysOps do use this, but we know that DevOps has very little bandwidth these days.
Action: Craig to ask in #devops if they can and are willing to work on this, then we can decide next steps.
Update: Craig Posted, in #devops, but not a single reply
This is referenced in the single-server deployment documentation, and not part of the official flower releases
Maybe the core platform team can take on this work since there hasn't been any replies from the devops community.
Action: Reach out to Jakub Skoczen to see if we can get some movement on this from either devops or core-platform teams (Craig)
Action: Ask #sys-ops if this is still needed, or can they switch to the docker containers. (Craig)
Looked at several SECURITY issues marked as "High" Severity.
SECURITY-129/ERM-3225we need to check if mod-agreements uses file uploads we know that mod-agreements uses file uploads; ping PO and dev lead?
SECURITY-145, 146, 147, 149 - will all be fixed by upgrading to Keycloak 24, which is slated to happen next sprint (193)
Today:
Action: Craig to bump the thread on FOLIO-3896 (related to debian packages)
Action: Create a Jira for folio devops to set Strict Transport Security header in hosted reference environments. Then link the story to
SECURITY-170
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Getting issue details...STATUS
Topic Backlog
Time permitting
Advice for handling of sensitive banking information
Team
From slack conversation, I think I've gathered the following:
In this case (bank account and transit numbers), the information is highly sensitive.
Highly sensitive information should:
Be stored in it's own table
Accessed via a dedicated API
Protected by a dedicated permission
Encrypted in the database, not only on disk.
This could mean either:
Explicitly encrypting/decrypting in the application layer and storing the encrypted data in postgres
Let's review and discuss before providing this feedback to Raman.
Axel Dörrer also suggested that defining classes of sensitivity could help teams determine which techniques are applicable in various situations. I agree having some general guidelines on this would be helpful.
regular data
low sensitive - permission based on same API
high sensitive - permission based on dedicated API
It would probably help to provide concrete examples of data in each class. This can be a longer term effort, we don't need to sort out all the details today.
Next Steps:
Clearly define/formalize the various classes
Come up with concrete examples of each class
Build out guidance
Come up with concrete examples of how to protect each class of data.
Consider storing some classes of data outside of postgres altogether - e.g. in secret storage.
What would be the guidance we provide to teams for this so we don't end up with each team doing things differently?
SecretStore interface and existing implementations are currently only read-only. They would need to be extended to allow for creation/mgmt of this information.
Craig to start a conversation in slack about this.
Seeking a volunteer to generate a draft document for us to review at a later meeting.
Today:
Axel Dörrer to do a first draft as a base for further discussions
Status on pentesting works within Network traffic control group