2024-10-24 Meeting notes

@Craig McNally 

@Julian Ladisch 

@Axel Dörrer 

@Ryan Berger 

@Chris Rutledge 

@Jakub Skoczen 

@John Coburn 

@Skott Klebe 

@Kevin Day

@Jens Heinrich

5 min

Proxy for Dev-Setup

 John + Team

• John has been discussing this with Zak/Jason - doing this in stripes-cli.  It sounds like they're coming around to this idea.

• A spike is still needed

  • @John Coburn will create the spike and ask for input/help from the rest of the Security team as needed.

• A spike has been created: STCLI-248: SPIKE: handle https connection through proxy.ClosedPreview

• Work continues, it isn't clear at the moment exactly what all the requirements are wrt what the proxy needs to do, e.g. STSH, etc.

• PR is up (https://github.com/folio-org/stripes-cli/pull/358) for handling this with the STSH headers.  Looking to merge this soon, after the switch over from Ramsons to Sunflower development.

• For now the STSH headers are just being stripped.  We can revisit later.

Today:

• ...

0 min

Jira Group and Security Level review

Team

From Craig in slack:

I've been in communication with David Crossley, Wayne Schneider, John Malconian and Peter Murray about the issue above.  They apparently didn't have access to these embargoed issues (SysOps and Core Team).  Peter shared this screenshot with me, which doesn't look right.  I'd like to review this at one of our meetings and come up with a list of changes/improvements for Peter to make.  A few ideas off the top of my head:

1. Add descriptions to each of the security groups, like we have for "FOLIO Security Group"

2. Maybe add a new security group and level for FOLIO devops

3. Review membership of each of these groups and remove users no longer on the project

4. Review the Security Level -> Group mappings.  Some of these don't look quite right to me.

https://files.slack.com/files-pri/T1EPYQDAQ-F075P5YMBJQ/image.png

• If it makes this easier, we could invite Peter to a meeting so we can see the groups/levels interactively and makes adjustments as we go

• Create a new group:  devops, and assign Wayne, John, Ian, David, Peter.  Also create a new security level for "folio devops"

• Remove Johannes Drexl from the SysOps group, he's not longer involved in Folio.

• Not exactly this, but related... 

  • Issues submitted to the SECURITY JIRA project should automatically be embargoed (Security Level = Folio Security Group)

  • The submitter of issues to the SECURITY JIRA project should be able to view issues they submit, regardless of their Security Level

  • Email notification sent to the Folio Security Group when an issue is created in the SECURITY Jira project.

• Action:  @Craig McNally to setup a meeting with Peter and representatives from the Security Team to work through these things after WOLFcon?  

  • We need to look into how security level configuration works to gain a better understanding of why it behaves the way it does.  

    • Why do we have All Folio Developers in the "Sys Ops and Core Team" security level?

Today:

• (Craig) no progress due to lack of time to spend on this.  Does someone else have time to work through this with Peter?

0 min

FOLIO-3896: Java 17 for build-debian-packageClosedPreview

Team

• We're officially dropping support for this going forward - no new debian packages will be created.

• Once the last version of the debian packages is out of the support window we can call this done.

• Revisit this around Ramsons GA

1 min

SECURITY-177: CVE-2024-34447 - bcprov-jdk18on hostname verification - Analysis of vulnerability - QuesneliaCompletedPreview SECURITY-182: host name verification of the https/TLS server certificateCompletedPreview SECURITY-189: CVE-2023-33202 - org.bouncycastle_bcprov-jdk18on - Analysis of vulnerability - QuesneliaCompletedPreview

Team

Do we need to backport these fixes to Q?  If so, it will need to go into CSP6

Today: 

• (Craig) will clarify if the fix in mod-data-export-spring needs to be backported (See SECURITY-189 / MODDEXPSP-270 (sp?)

Misc Topics from Slack

Team

• Let's not backport anything to Morning Glory.

  • Instead suggest that those who need this do it in a fork.

• The clickjacking issue reported isn't a problem since folio.org is a static website

  • We should respond to the reporter, at least acknowledging that we received his repeated emails.

    • Craig will respond, apologize for the delayed response, and explain that this isn't a problem.  Will CC other team members.

  • Do we have a gap in our processes?  Why wasn't this raised for discussion sooner (first email was in May)?

    • Reminder, if you notice an email addressed to the security team email, raise it at the next meeting or in slack.

*

Anything Urgent?
Review Mike's Kanban board?
Review Security board?

Under Review Filter: 

Team

• Snyk review - criticals!

  • mod-spring-sample.  Several criticals.  Need a story to bump dependencies to the Ramsons versions and see if there's anything left.

    • Julian found this:  https://folio-org.atlassian.net/issues/FOLIO-4016 "Archive mod-spring-sample"

      • TAMU can hopefully handle this... keep it here as a reminder.

    • @Chris Rutledge followed up on this, the older dockerfiles with vulnerabilities in mod-camunda and mod-workflow will not be used starting from TAMU's next upgrade.  

      • The dockerfile with these vulnerabilities will go away, but mod-camunda and mod-workflow are both being actively developed and will eventually be submitted for TC approval.

    • Julian already marked these as "ignore" in Snyk since the dockerfiles include an apt-get update.

  • CVE-2024-37371 and others in Dockerfile - need a story to investigate/resolve the critical vulnerabilities in the following dockerfiles:

    • mod-z3950

    • Enable "Status → Ignored" to see the reason why the vulns have been ignored.

    • dockerfiles include an apt-get update, so this shouldn't be an issue.

  • TODO application-builder - a critical vulnerability related to Babel/Traverse should be upgraded.

    • @Craig McNally will create an issue and follow-up with Eureka on this one.

• platform-minimal has a critical vulnerability related to Babel/Traverse.  

  • Platform-minimal has not been updated in some time.  The version of ui-users which pulls in the vulnerable dependency is old compared to the latest version

  • We should archive this repo since it hasn't been updated in ~2 years.  

    • Next step is to create a Jira for this, similar to FOLIO-4016.  @Ryan Berger will do this. 

Time permitting

Advice for handling of sensitive banking information

Team

From slack conversation, I think I've gathered the following:

• In this case (bank account and transit numbers), the information is highly sensitive.  

  • Highly sensitive information should:

    • Be stored in it's own table

    • Accessed via a dedicated API

    • Protected by a dedicated permission

    • Encrypted in the database, not only on disk.  

      • This could mean either:

        • Explicitly encrypting/decrypting in the application layer and storing the encrypted data in postgres

        • Utilizing postgres extensions/modules to encypt certain columns, e.g. via pgcrypto (see https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/encryption-options.html)

Let's review and discuss before providing this feedback to Raman.

@Axel Dörrer also suggested that defining classes of sensitivity could help teams determine which techniques are applicable in various situations.  I agree having some general guidelines on this would be helpful.

• regular data

  • low sensitive - permission based on same API

  • high sensitive - permission based on dedicated API

It would probably help to provide concrete examples of data in each class.  This can be a longer term effort, we don't need to sort out all the details today.

• Next Steps:

  • Clearly define/formalize the various classes

    • Come up with concrete examples of each class

    • Build out guidance

      • Come up with concrete examples of how to protect each class of data.

    • Consider storing some classes of data outside of postgres altogether - e.g. in secret storage.

      • What would be the guidance we provide to teams for this so we don't end up with each team doing things differently?

      • SecretStore interface and existing implementations are currently only read-only.  They would need to be extended to allow for creation/mgmt of this information.

    • Craig to start a conversation in slack about this.

      • Seeking a volunteer to generate a draft document for us to review at a later meeting.

Today:

@Axel Dörrer to do a first draft as a base for further discussions

Status on pentesting works within Network traffic control group

@Axel Dörrer 

Due to some absences on different reasons the group stalled. Axel will try to reactivate the group.