2024-09-19 Meeting notes

@Craig McNally 

@Julian Ladisch 

@Axel Dörrer 

@Ryan Berger 

@Chris Rutledge 

@Jakub Skoczen 

@John Coburn 

@Skott Klebe 

@Kevin Day

@Jens Heinrich

Out next week Aug 29, 2024 

5 min

Proxy for Dev-Setup

 John + Team

• John has been discussing this with Zak/Jason - doing this in stripes-cli.  It sounds like they're coming around to this idea.

• A spike is still needed

  • @John Coburn will create the spike and ask for input/help from the rest of the Security team as needed.

• A spike has been created: https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/STCLI-248

Today:

• Discussions with Zak continue, but progress is unlikely until after WOLFcon

5 min

Cookie SameSite topic raised in Slack

Team + Zak

• Only remaining gotcha is how this will work with STSH (strict transport security headers)

• @John Coburn created a ticket to include CORS in the proxy
  
  

  • https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/STCLI-247

  • @Kevin Day will test something by Zak here

• TAMU is using an older version of Okapi which is making things more complicated, Kevin is making due.

• Update from @John Coburn via slack:

  • "I believe Zak set up a branch with CORS updates to stripes-cli. Not sure if it's been merged yet." 

• There is a PR linked in the Jira above, and it is not merged yet.  https://github.com/folio-org/stripes-cli/pull/351

• @Kevin Day would like to suggest not making this specific to localhost:3000
  
  

  • See https://github.com/folio-org/stripes-cli/compare/master...kaladay:stripes-cli-2.x-backports:proxy-strip-acao-custom

• See above.  PR is still open.  Zak is going to take another look at the PR (potentially in the context of Kevin's suggestion).

Today:

• It looks like the PR has been merged.  

• We can remove this from next week's agenda.

0 min

Jira Group and Security Level review

Team

From Craig in slack:

I've been in communication with David Crossley, Wayne Schneider, John Malconian and Peter Murray about the issue above.  They apparently didn't have access to these embargoed issues (SysOps and Core Team).  Peter shared this screenshot with me, which doesn't look right.  I'd like to review this at one of our meetings and come up with a list of changes/improvements for Peter to make.  A few ideas off the top of my head:

1. Add descriptions to each of the security groups, like we have for "FOLIO Security Group"

2. Maybe add a new security group and level for FOLIO devops

3. Review membership of each of these groups and remove users no longer on the project

4. Review the Security Level -> Group mappings.  Some of these don't look quite right to me.

https://files.slack.com/files-pri/T1EPYQDAQ-F075P5YMBJQ/image.png

• If it makes this easier, we could invite Peter to a meeting so we can see the groups/levels interactively and makes adjustments as we go

• Create a new group:  devops, and assign Wayne, John, Ian, David, Peter.  Also create a new security level for "folio devops"

• Remove Johannes Drexl from the SysOps group, he's not longer involved in Folio.

• Not exactly this, but related... 

  • Issues submitted to the SECURITY JIRA project should automatically be embargoed (Security Level = Folio Security Group)

  • The submitter of issues to the SECURITY JIRA project should be able to view issues they submit, regardless of their Security Level

  • Email notification sent to the Folio Security Group when an issue is created in the SECURITY Jira project.

• Action:  @Craig McNally to setup a meeting with Peter and representatives from the Security Team to work through these things after WOLFcon?  

  • We need to look into how security level configuration works to gain a better understanding of why it behaves the way it does.  

    • Why do we have All Folio Developers in the "Sys Ops and Core Team" security level?

0 min

https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/FOLIO-3896

Team

• We need to determine if DevOps can work on  or if they don't have bandwidth, and the debian packages aren't used anymore, archive them.  It sounds like some SysOps do use this, but we know that DevOps has very little bandwidth these days.

  Open

  

• Still no word from @Jakub Skoczen on this.  Maybe escalate to Mike G.?

  • Action:  @Craig McNally will start a chat and include @Julian Ladisch as well.

• Jenkins pipeline is on Java 11 and needs to be upgraded to Java 17 (maybe 21 soon)

• Alternative to updating the jenkins pipeiline:  Instead of using Jenkins, maybe we can use GitHub actions in the Okapi repository so that the core-platform team can maintain it without any devOps need.  This requires some sensitive info (debian repository credentials) to be moved to Github (in a secure way obviously)

• Third option is to just remove support for the debian packages altogether

  • Technically this is where we're at since debian packages haven't been created for a while now (no debian packages since Okapi v5.0.2 release September 2023)

• @Craig McNally started a group chat (see above).

Today:

• @Julian Ladisch asked about this in #sys-ops, Ingolf responded saying 
  
  

  • remove it (don't mention it) from Quesnelia

• We're officially dropping support for this going forward - no new debian packages will be created.

• Once the last version of the debian packages is out of the support window we can call this done.

• Revisit this around Ramsons GA

< 5 min

XSS in staff slips (edit)

Team

See https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/STRIPES-933 and https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/SECURITY-194

• We did not make the deadline for Quesnelia CSP4. 

• Targeting QCSP5, but approval has not yet been request.

  • Will need to backport to Quesnelia assuming we get approval.

25 min

Anything Urgent?
Review Mike's Kanban board?
Review Security board?

Under Review Filter: 

Team

• https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/SECURITY-194

  • PR has been merged, CSP approval to be requested.

• https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/SECURITY-180 

  • @Julian Ladisch is creating stories and PRs to address this in the master branch (Ramsons)

  • If we find vulnerabilities, we may want/need to backport this to Quesnelia and possibly Poppy as well.

  • See Dependencies out of support#Spring-5 for additional details, including a GH search which shows the affected repos

• https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/SECURITY-56 

  • The two linked stories are closed, but we need to double check that the version of grails they upgraded to (and other deps) is sufficient to address the vulnerability. Done. Also confirmed by snyk.

• https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/SECURITY-65

  • Should be addressed in Quesnelia, but has not yet made it into a Poppy CSP.

  • Since this spans multiple repos/teams it's our responsibility to seek approval for this.

  • Further discussion is required.  Do we really think this is worth pushing for a Poppy CSP?  Who is even affected?

Today:

• Regarding https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/SECURITY-177 / SECURITY-182: host name verification of the https/TLS server certificateCompletedPreview, Taras is out until mid-next-week.  I believe he has/will create the necessary JIRAs to get this addressed.  We can check with him on where this stands when he returns.

Time permitting

Advice for handling of sensitive banking information

Team

From slack conversation, I think I've gathered the following:

• In this case (bank account and transit numbers), the information is highly sensitive.  

  • Highly sensitive information should:

    • Be stored in it's own table

    • Accessed via a dedicated API

    • Protected by a dedicated permission

    • Encrypted in the database, not only on disk.  

      • This could mean either:

        • Explicitly encrypting/decrypting in the application layer and storing the encrypted data in postgres

        • Utilizing postgres extensions/modules to encypt certain columns, e.g. via pgcrypto (see https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/encryption-options.html)

Let's review and discuss before providing this feedback to Raman.

@Axel Dörrer also suggested that defining classes of sensitivity could help teams determine which techniques are applicable in various situations.  I agree having some general guidelines on this would be helpful.

• regular data

  • low sensitive - permission based on same API

  • high sensitive - permission based on dedicated API

It would probably help to provide concrete examples of data in each class.  This can be a longer term effort, we don't need to sort out all the details today.

• Next Steps:

  • Clearly define/formalize the various classes

    • Come up with concrete examples of each class

    • Build out guidance

      • Come up with concrete examples of how to protect each class of data.

    • Consider storing some classes of data outside of postgres altogether - e.g. in secret storage.

      • What would be the guidance we provide to teams for this so we don't end up with each team doing things differently?

      • SecretStore interface and existing implementations are currently only read-only.  They would need to be extended to allow for creation/mgmt of this information.

    • Craig to start a conversation in slack about this.

      • Seeking a volunteer to generate a draft document for us to review at a later meeting.

Today:

@Axel Dörrer to do a first draft as a base for further discussions

Status on pentesting works within Network traffic control group

@Axel Dörrer 

Due to some absences on different reasons the group stalled. Axel will try to reactivate the group.