| Time | Item | Who | Notes |
|---|
| 0 min | Kafka security | Team | The topic of Kafka security was raised as part of a conversation at the TC yesterday. The Security Team should be aware of this and probably should weigh in on the topic, or even generate proposals if we have ideas for how to solve the problem.
Today: - On hold until the RFC is available for review.
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| 1 min | OWASP/SNYK | Team | - Epic: FOLIO-3582 OWASP checks, reviews, and fitness functions
- Feature: FOLIO-3583 OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
- User Story: FOLIO-3584 SPIKE - investigate OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
- Progress on FOLIO-3584?
- Skott ran a scan against MG Bugfest
- Skott Klebe and Craig McNally to review results... weed out false positives, then bring results to next week's meeting.
- Scan stopped at 95% (OOM issue in Firefox)
- Any other features/stories we want to create?
- Not related to OWASP, but I think Skott Klebe suggested that our SNYK could be tuned/adjusted to better suit our needs.
- Maybe make the Epic more generic – "Security Fitness Functions" or Create another epic to track the non-OWASP stuff?
- SNYK
- Should define JIRAs
- Spike to investigate how we can tune snyk to better suit our needs – Craig McNally to create this.
- Provided some background/history about SNYK in the FOLIO community
- Stripes architecture reviews dependencies every other flower release (1-2x/year)
- Currently only looking at platform level (with package.json/lock files)
- Avoids a lot of the dev/peer dependency false alarms
- Skott Klebe will have limited time to spend on SG activities but will have some time to spend on the TBD Snyk spike in mid-December.
- It sounds like he's seeking help from someone more familiar with snyk ... either to have a conversation or provide documentation links.
- All this means is the spike JIRA should contain documentation links
- Also need to clarify which repos are integrated with Snyk, and what the process looks like for managing this.
- TODO: look at the FOLIO documentation on Snyk.
Today: - Spike still hasn't been created yet.
|
| 1 min | Cumulative upload problem | Team | - Regarding file upload size issues (See
 FOLIO-3317 - Spike - investigate possible file upload vulnerability OPEN ), let's brainstorm ideas for mitigating the cumulative upload problem, not just the large file upload size problem. - Some APIs are more vulnerable to this than others, such as those not protected by permissions - e.g. mod-login, edge APIs, etc.
- Axel provided some background/context. We still need to give this some thought and possibly suggest a solution
- Use case 1: Some script unintentionally sends endless data to some API. This is caught by a maximum upload size.
- Use case 2: Denial of service. Difficult to address in Okapi. Might be better handled in other tools like nginx or firewalls that can limit requests. Unlikely that a denial of service attack has a valid login / access token.
- TODO: For use case 2: Only add documentation that implementers should use an external firewall (or external nginx) to limit requests.
- Some investigation is required, let's capture this in a spike (JIRA).
- Axel Dörrer to help define this. – Started, not finished yet.
- We can review together and find someone to work on this... maybe have a champion on this team work with someone in the Sys-ops SIG/community.
- Created
FOLIO-3615
-
Getting issue details...
STATUS
Chris Rutledge and Axel Dörrer to look at it and ask sysops folks to chime in
- Let's create a wiki page to capture ideas/feedback - Axel Dörrer → done
- Raised at the SysOps meeting
- A small working group was formed, but has not yet met.
- Group is meeting on Fridays... See link above for meeting notes, etc.
- Will be creating a test env. to aid in the investigation
- A similar issue was discovered in folio-vertx-lib... linked the issue to FOLIO_3317
- Wrapping up definition of test cases.
- essentially on pause until next year.
Today: - No progress yet. Will meet tomorrow
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| 1 min | STCOR-395 "refactor login form to avoid using any form framework whatsoever" | | - Create a spike to investigate what's involved in divorcing the login page from the NPM ecosystem. Will reach out to John and Ryan as needed.
- Reopen STCOR-395 and block on the spike. – Done.
- Where does this stand? Get an update from Ryan Berger / John Coburn
- Waiting for the spike (
STCOR-651
-
Getting issue details...
STATUS
) to be completed. – currently in the Open state.
- John to reach out to Skott to discuss what the level of risk associated with this. – Still needs to happen.
- John Coburn pulled together two PoCs. See comments in
STCOR-651
-
Getting issue details...
STATUS
- How do we want to move forward?
- Solutions need to be reviewed and discussed.
- Sounds like the iframe approach is a non-starter... actually a step in the wrong direction security-wise
- John Coburn (and others) to read up on browser CSPs
- John Coburn has made some progress on investing CSPs
- Will share some draft guidance we may want to include into the installation documentation (via slack)
- SG will review and provide feedback. Skott Klebe please take a look too
- Next up: John to work on some spike work - focused on introducing CSPs on the folio-snapshot site
- can serve as a reference impl of the guidance we'll be adding to the install docs
- Not much progress since last week, but hopefully get some movement on this soon.
Today: - No progress, will check in next week.
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| 1 min | Spring versions and the Official Supported Technologies pages | | Julian Ladisch 3:51 AM I've added versions for the Spring components to the Officially Supported Technologies list. For Orchid it's easy: https://folio-org.atlassian.net/wiki/display/TC/OrchidFor Nolana it's more complicated: https://folio-org.atlassian.net/wiki/display/TC/NolanaThe OSS support of several Spring components ends in May 2023. This is more than three months before the end of the Nolana support period that end in August or September 2023. The next minor version of those Spring components will be released in November 2022, this is during Nolana bug fest. We need to bump to this next minor version and release a bug fix for all affected FOLIO Spring libraries and FOLIO modules in November 2022.Running unsupported Spring components is a security risk. If there is a security issue in a supported Spring component we simply can bump the patch version, no risk. If there is a security issue in an unsupported Spring component we don't get notified because it's unsupported, and if we know of an issue we need to bump the minor version, this comes with some risk. Bumping the minor version as early as possible gives more testing time and is less risky. We can discuss this today. How do we want to approach this? How do we communicate this out? How much work is expected to be required? Craig McNally to follow up with Oleksii P. again to see if the team has discussed this yet.
Met with Oleksii P. and Spring-force. They're onboard with this proposal and will take it from here. There are complications with this... conversations in #folio-spring-base: For details see Nolana#Frameworks.1 Spring Boot 2.7 has extended OSS support until 2023-11-18, this completely covers the Nolana support period (~ August 2023), no need to switch to Spring Boot 3, but see below However, folio-spring-base also uses Spring Cloud, and other Spring way modules also use other Spring components without extended OSS support Spring Cloud 3.1 support ends 2023-05-18, this is at least three months before the end of the Nolana support period around August 2023. Spring Cloud 4.0 GA release will be in November 2022. Spring Force team has agreed that Milestone versions can be used. These need to be replaced by the GA version. Nolana GA release will be in December 2022. Only recently (2022-10-04) Spring Force noticed that Spring Cloud 4 requires Java 17 and only (officially) supports Spring Boot 3.
Also introduced the topic at the Technical Council meeting yesterday but ran out of time. The TC will discuss more in slack and if necessary at next week's TC meeting.
Update from Julian Ladisch / Craig McNally... Summary: Last week it was decided that the Spring Upgrade (Spring Boot from 2.7 to 3, Spring Cloud from 3.1 to 4) and the Java Upgrade from 11 to 17 is postponed to Orchid; and:
Two options that need to be discussed in January 2023
 - Postpone for now – at some point we need to check in with spring-force to see how things are going
- Looks like JIRAs have been created for some of this – a good sign
- Seem some JIRAs have been created. Need to get an update from Taras / Spring force at some point.
Today: - Quick update - some analysis has been done. Still not clear if the upgrades will make it into Orchid, etc.
- Craig McNally to provide an update next week.
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| 1 min | Security Team processes - revisited | Team | Review/discuss the proposal shared in slack - The team reviewed the document changes and agreed that everything looks good.
- Craig McNally to merge these changes into the official document
- Craig McNally to notify Khalilah of these changes. It will be up to her to decide how to disseminate this information to the POs
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| 5-10 min | MODEXPS-186 | Julian/Team | MODEXPS-186 "Describe way how to check dependency vulnerabilities during RMB versions upgrade" reads: Purpose/Overview: We need to increase version of dependencies that have vulnerabilities during RMB versions upgrade
Approach:
Contact with Julian Ladisch how to run vulnerabilies scanner to identify list of versions that need to be increased. Add step into acceptance criteria of RMB upgrade stories to run this scanner and update versions of these dependencies.
Update Jira template of RMB upgrade story to include this new step to check vulnerable versions.
Is there some misunderstanding?
For each flower release development teams should upgrade all third party dependencies. Either to the latest production ready version, or to an older version that is supported by the third party for the complete period of the FOLIO flower release (if the development team uses some unsupported version it must do security monitoring and prepare for backporting security fixes and for writing security fixes if no fixes are provided by the third party).
These upgrades should be made for all dependencies, regardless of any known vulnerabilities. This is needed to keep hot fixes as small as possible if a vulnerability needs to be back-ported later on.
- If teams commit to updating all of their dependencies on a per-flower-release basis, the need for teams to use a vulnerability scanner is much less.
- When communicating the revised security team processes (see above) to the product owners (via Khalilah), we should also strongly recommend that teams do this.
- Maybe we can get the TC to endorse this and make it official policy?
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* | Review the Kanban board. | Team | |
| Time permitting | Cyber Resilience Act | Team | I raised this with the TC but we should also be aware... https://blog.nlnetlabs.nl/open-source-software-vs-the-cyber-resilience-act/ https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cyber-resilience-act |