I've been in communication with David Crossley, Wayne Schneider, John Malconian and Peter Murray about the issue above. They apparently didn't have access to these embargoed issues (SysOps and Core Team). Peter shared this screenshot with me, which doesn't look right. I'd like to review this at one of our meetings and come up with a list of changes/improvements for Peter to make. A few ideas off the top of my head:
Add descriptions to each of the security groups, like we have for "FOLIO Security Group"
Maybe add a new security group and level for FOLIO devops
Review membership of each of these groups and remove users no longer on the project
Review the Security Level -> Group mappings. Some of these don't look quite right to me.
We need to determine if DevOps can work on or if they don't have bandwidth, and the debian packages aren't used anymore, archive them. It sounds like some SysOps do use this, but we know that DevOps has very little bandwidth these days.
Still no word from Jakub Skoczen on this. Maybe escalate to Mike G.?
Jenkins pipeline is on Java 11 and needs to be upgraded to Java 17 (maybe 21 soon)
Alternative to updating the jenkins pipeiline: Instead of using Jenkins, maybe we can use GitHub actions in the Okapi repository so that the core-platform team can maintain it without any devOps need. This requires some sensitive info (debian repository credentials) to be moved to Github (in a secure way obviously)
Third option is to just remove support for the debian packages altogether
Technically this is where we're at since debian packages haven't been created for a while now (no debian packages since Okapi v5.0.2 release September 2023)
The two linked stories are closed, but we need to double check that the version of grails they upgraded to (and other deps) is sufficient to address the vulnerability.
Should be addressed in Quesnelia, but has not yet made it into a Poppy CSP.
Since this spans multiple repos/teams it's our responsibility to seek approval for this.
Further discussion is required. Do we really think this is worth pushing for a Poppy CSP? Who is even affected?
Today:
Regarding
SECURITY-177
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Getting issue details...STATUS
/
SECURITY-182
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Getting issue details...STATUS
, Taras is out until mid-next-week. I believe he has/will create the necessary JIRAs to get this addressed. We can check with him on where this stands when he returns.
Topic Backlog
Time permitting
Advice for handling of sensitive banking information
Team
From slack conversation, I think I've gathered the following:
In this case (bank account and transit numbers), the information is highly sensitive.
Highly sensitive information should:
Be stored in it's own table
Accessed via a dedicated API
Protected by a dedicated permission
Encrypted in the database, not only on disk.
This could mean either:
Explicitly encrypting/decrypting in the application layer and storing the encrypted data in postgres
Let's review and discuss before providing this feedback to Raman.
Axel Dörrer also suggested that defining classes of sensitivity could help teams determine which techniques are applicable in various situations. I agree having some general guidelines on this would be helpful.
regular data
low sensitive - permission based on same API
high sensitive - permission based on dedicated API
It would probably help to provide concrete examples of data in each class. This can be a longer term effort, we don't need to sort out all the details today.
Next Steps:
Clearly define/formalize the various classes
Come up with concrete examples of each class
Build out guidance
Come up with concrete examples of how to protect each class of data.
Consider storing some classes of data outside of postgres altogether - e.g. in secret storage.
What would be the guidance we provide to teams for this so we don't end up with each team doing things differently?
SecretStore interface and existing implementations are currently only read-only. They would need to be extended to allow for creation/mgmt of this information.
Craig to start a conversation in slack about this.
Seeking a volunteer to generate a draft document for us to review at a later meeting.
Today:
Axel Dörrer to do a first draft as a base for further discussions
Status on pentesting works within Network traffic control group