John has been discussing this with Zak/Jason - doing this in stripes-cli. It sounds like they're coming around to this idea.
A spike is still needed
John Coburn will create the spike and ask for input/help from the rest of the Security team as needed.
A spike has been created:
STCLI-248
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Getting issue details...STATUS
Discussions with Zak continue, but progress is unlikely until after WOLFcon
Today:
Situation has not changed. John will discuss with Zak again soon
0 min
Jira Group and Security Level review
Team
From Craig in slack:
I've been in communication with David Crossley, Wayne Schneider, John Malconian and Peter Murray about the issue above. They apparently didn't have access to these embargoed issues (SysOps and Core Team). Peter shared this screenshot with me, which doesn't look right. I'd like to review this at one of our meetings and come up with a list of changes/improvements for Peter to make. A few ideas off the top of my head:
Add descriptions to each of the security groups, like we have for "FOLIO Security Group"
Maybe add a new security group and level for FOLIO devops
Review membership of each of these groups and remove users no longer on the project
Review the Security Level -> Group mappings. Some of these don't look quite right to me.
The two linked stories are closed, but we need to double check that the version of grails they upgraded to (and other deps) is sufficient to address the vulnerability. Done. Also confirmed by snyk.
Should be addressed in Quesnelia, but has not yet made it into a Poppy CSP.
Since this spans multiple repos/teams it's our responsibility to seek approval for this.
Further discussion is required. Do we really think this is worth pushing for a Poppy CSP? Who is even affected?
Regarding
SECURITY-177
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Getting issue details...STATUS
/
SECURITY-182
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Getting issue details...STATUS
, Taras is out until mid-next-week. I believe he has/will create the necessary JIRAs to get this addressed. We can check with him on where this stands when he returns.
Craig McNally will touch base with Taras to ensure JIRAs are created and linked as needed
Do we need to backport these fixes to Q? If so, it will need to go into CSP6
It seems clear that we DON'T need this for Poppy, but probably do need it for Quesnelia
Today:
Topic Backlog
Time permitting
Advice for handling of sensitive banking information
Team
From slack conversation, I think I've gathered the following:
In this case (bank account and transit numbers), the information is highly sensitive.
Highly sensitive information should:
Be stored in it's own table
Accessed via a dedicated API
Protected by a dedicated permission
Encrypted in the database, not only on disk.
This could mean either:
Explicitly encrypting/decrypting in the application layer and storing the encrypted data in postgres
Let's review and discuss before providing this feedback to Raman.
Axel Dörrer also suggested that defining classes of sensitivity could help teams determine which techniques are applicable in various situations. I agree having some general guidelines on this would be helpful.
regular data
low sensitive - permission based on same API
high sensitive - permission based on dedicated API
It would probably help to provide concrete examples of data in each class. This can be a longer term effort, we don't need to sort out all the details today.
Next Steps:
Clearly define/formalize the various classes
Come up with concrete examples of each class
Build out guidance
Come up with concrete examples of how to protect each class of data.
Consider storing some classes of data outside of postgres altogether - e.g. in secret storage.
What would be the guidance we provide to teams for this so we don't end up with each team doing things differently?
SecretStore interface and existing implementations are currently only read-only. They would need to be extended to allow for creation/mgmt of this information.
Craig to start a conversation in slack about this.
Seeking a volunteer to generate a draft document for us to review at a later meeting.
Today:
Axel Dörrer to do a first draft as a base for further discussions
Status on pentesting works within Network traffic control group