Skip to end of banner
Go to start of banner

2024-05-30 Meeting notes

Skip to end of metadata
Go to start of metadata

You are viewing an old version of this page. View the current version.

Compare with Current View Page History

« Previous Version 3 Next »

Date

Attendees

NamePresentPlanned Absences

Craig McNally 

Yes
Julian Ladisch 


Axel Dörrer 



Ryan Berger 


Chris Rutledge 



Jakub Skoczen 



John Coburn 


Skott Klebe 



Zak BurkeYes

Discussion items

TimeItemWhoNotes
10-15 minCookie SameSite topic raised in SlackTeam + Zak
  • Production systems should be setup with SameSite = Strict or Lax
    • Bugfest should be setup in this way, but it's currently set to none.
    • Julian will continue to try to get Kitfox to move this back to Strict/Lax
  • Hosted reference envs, and other envs (e.g. rancher envs, etc.) which UI devs might develop against (point a local UI build at) should either:
    • Use SameSite = none OR
    • UI devs should use a proxy like NGINX (running locally)
  • Generally speaking it's better to user SameSite=Strict/Lax when possible to help identify issues earlier
  • Action: Craig to invite Zak to next week's Security Team meeting to discuss further.
1 minUpdate on SECURITY-159 / FOLIO-4012Craig
5 minTLS for edge modulesJulian + Team

For Quesnelia Bug Fix all edge modules got TLS support.

Spring based edge modules must fix TLS related security issues: FOLSPRINGS-156, EDGCMNSPR-53 ("Spring Boot 3.2.6, bcprov-jdk18on 1.78 fixing vulns")
These issues did not affect the edge modules until they started supporting TLS.

1-15 minJira Group and Security Level reviewTeam

From Craig in slack:

I've been in communication with David Crossley, Wayne Schneider, John Malconian and Peter Murray about the issue above.  They apparently didn't have access to these embargoed issues (SysOps and Core Team).  Peter shared this screenshot with me, which doesn't look right.  I'd like to review this at one of our meetings and come up with a list of changes/improvements for Peter to make.  A few ideas off the top of my head:
  1. Add descriptions to each of the security groups, like we have for "FOLIO Security Group"
  2. Maybe add a new security group and level for FOLIO devops
  3. Review membership of each of these groups and remove users no longer on the project
  4. Review the Security Level -> Group mappings.  Some of these don't look quite right to me.
https://files.slack.com/files-pri/T1EPYQDAQ-F075P5YMBJQ/image.png
  • If it makes this easier, we could invite Peter to a meeting so we can see the groups/levels interactively and makes adjustments as we go
Remaining timeAnything Urgent? Review the Kanban board?Team
  • We need to determine if DevOps can work on  FOLIO-3896 - Getting issue details... STATUS  or if they don't have bandwidth, and the debian packages aren't used anymore, archive them.  It sounds like some SysOps do use this, but we know that DevOps has very little bandwidth these days.
    • Action:  Craig to ask in #devops if they can and are willing to work on this, then we can decide next steps.
    • Update:  Craig Posted, in #devops, but not a single reply
    • This is referenced in the single-server deployment documentation, and not part of the official flower releases
    • Maybe the core platform team can take on this work since there hasn't been any replies from the devops community.
    • Action:  Reach out to Jakub Skoczen to see if we can get some movement on this from either devops or core-platform teams (Craig)
    • Action:  Ask #sys-ops if this is still needed, or can they switch to the docker containers. (Craig)


  • Discussed potential improvements to Jira workflows (SECURITY project)
    • Automatically embargo (set the security level to Folio Security Team)
    • Allow the creator to see issues after being embargoed
    • Action:  Craig to move this to the topic backlog


  • Fixes to the XSS issues have made it into Poppy CSP #3,4,5 
    • Poppy CSP5 was released on  
Topic Backlog
Time permittingAdvice for handling of sensitive banking informationTeam

From slack conversation, I think I've gathered the following:

  • In this case (bank account and transit numbers), the information is highly sensitive.  
  • Highly sensitive information should:
    • Be stored in it's own table
    • Accessed via a dedicated API
    • Protected by a dedicated permission
    • Encrypted in the database, not only on disk.  

Let's review and discuss before providing this feedback to Raman.

Axel Dörrer also suggested that defining classes of sensitivity could help teams determine which techniques are applicable in various situations.  I agree having some general guidelines on this would be helpful.

  • regular data
  • low sensitive - permission based on same API
  • high sensitive - permission based on dedicated API

It would probably help to provide concrete examples of data in each class.  This can be a longer term effort, we don't need to sort out all the details today.

  • Next Steps:
    • Clearly define/formalize the various classes
      • Come up with concrete examples of each class
    • Build out guidance
      • Come up with concrete examples of how to protect each class of data.
    • Consider storing some classes of data outside of postgres altogether - e.g. in secret storage.
      • What would be the guidance we provide to teams for this so we don't end up with each team doing things differently?
      • SecretStore interface and existing implementations are currently only read-only.  They would need to be extended to allow for creation/mgmt of this information.
    • Craig to start a conversation in slack about this.
      • Seeking a volunteer to generate a draft document for us to review at a later meeting.

Today:

Axel Dörrer to do a first draft as a base for further discussions


Status on pentesting works within Network traffic control group

Axel Dörrer 

Due to some absences on different reasons the group stalled. Axel will try to reactivate the group.

Action items

  •  


  • No labels