Overview
Unpatched versions of Nolana and Orchid are vulnerable to critical security issues related to system users. These users are provisioned by modules themselves and are used to perform internal module-to-module operations. Credentials for these users are hardcoded in the source code. This makes it trivial to authenticate as these users, allowing unauthorized access to potentially dangerous APIs, including those which allow configuration to be viewed and modified, the ability to access user data, as well as fees/fines.
Due to the risk and exploitability of these vulnerabilities, they were embargoed, and details were not fully disclosed until system operators had a chance to patch their systems.
See the following advisories for additional information
- https://github.com/folio-org/mod-data-export-spring/security/advisories/GHSA-vf78-3q9f-92g3
- https://github.com/folio-org/mod-remote-storage/security/advisories/GHSA-m8v7-469p-5x89
Remediation
Unfortunately we are unaware of a workaround. However, the following releases have been made to patch the aforementioned critical security vulnerabilities:
- mod-data-export-spring-2.0.2 (Orchid)
- mod-data-export-spring-1.5.4 (Nolana)
- mod-remote-storage-2.0.3 (Orchid)
- mod-remote-storage-1.7.2 (Nolana)
These patch versions will be included in official Critical Service Patch (CSP) releases for both Nolana and Orchid (Details TBD).
System operators are advised to immediately apply this fix for both modules if they haven't done so already.
Patch Instructions
- For your flower release configure the new mod-data-export-spring and mod-remote-storage versions, you MUST set the
SYSTEM_USER_PASSWORDenvironment variable. Avoid using values which are easy to guess, such as the module name or the system username. - Deploy the new module versions.
- For each tenant
$TENANTmigrate to the new module version:- For Orchid:
curl -d '[{"id":"mod-data-export-spring-2.0.2","action":"enable"},{"id":"mod-remote-storage-2.0.3","action":"enable"}]'$OKAPI/_/proxy/tenants/$TENANT/install?reinstall=true - For Nolana:
curl -d '[{"id":"mod-data-export-spring-1.5.4","action":"enable"},{"id":"mod-remote-storage-1.7.2","action":"enable"}]'$OKAPI/_/proxy/tenants/$TENANT/install?reinstall=true
- For Orchid:
- For each tenant verify that the patch has been successfully applied: Go to the UI and try to login. Use the default username
data-export-system-userandsystem-user(for remote-storage) and the new password. NOTE: These system users do not have UI permissions, so once you log in, you won't be able to do anything in the UI/stripes. It's sufficient to check that you're able to authenticate. - You may also want to check the logs for these two modules for any entries which might indicate a problem.
N.B. If you set a non-default system user name by setting SYSTEM_USER_NAME you MUST manually disable or delete the existing system user with the default user name.
N.B. After changing SYSTEM_USER_PASSWORD or SYSTEM_USER_NAME it is NOT sufficient to only redeploy the module; you also MUST reinstall the module as show above.
N.B. Disabling an affected module is NOT sufficient to fix the vulnerability.
Am I a victim?
Unfortunately the Folio Security Team is unaware of a way to conclusively determine if these vulnerabilities have been exploited. OKAPI does log the user ID for all proxied requests, so you may look for unusual activity associated with either of these users. Depending on your hosting infrastructure, it may also be possible to look at load balancer and/or reverse proxy logs, but there may not be enough information logged there if request payloads/certain headers aren't captured. Another challenge is the volume of logs which need to be inspected. These vulnerabilities have been around for a long time (~2 years). Looking for something subjective like "unusual behavior" isn't something which can be easily scripted/automated, and looking at 2 years of logs manually isn't realistic either.