MODEXPS-186"Describe way how to check dependency vulnerabilities during RMB versions upgrade" reads:
Purpose/Overview:We need to increase version of dependencies that have vulnerabilities during RMB versions upgrade Approach: Contact withJulian Ladischhow to run vulnerably scanner to identify list of versions that need to be increased. Add step into acceptance criteria of RMB upgrade stories to run this scanner and update versions of these dependencies. Update Jira template of RMB upgrade story to include this new step to check vulnerable versions.
Is there some misunderstanding? For each flower release development teams should upgradeallthird party dependencies. Either to the latest production ready version, or to an older version that is supported by the third party for the complete period of the FOLIO flower release (if the development team uses some unsupported version it must do security monitoring and prepare for backporting security fixes and for writing security fixes if no fixes are provided by the third party). These upgrades should be made for all dependencies, regardless of any known vulnerabilities. This is needed to keep hot fixes as small as possible if a vulnerability needs to be back-ported later on.
If teams commit to updating all of their dependencies on a per-flower-release basis, the need for teams to use a vulnerability scanner is much less.
When communicating the revised security team processes (see above) to the product owners (via Khalilah), we should also strongly recommend that teams do this.
Maybe we can get the TC to endorse this and make it official policy?
Update from slack:
@hereI just had a conversation with Khalilah, she has a plan for asking teams to regularly update their dependencies each release cycle and will be communicating it out to teams on March 1. Leading up to that we both took some action items:
Khalilah will create user stories for individual teams/modules to check their dependencies and upgrade them during the bugfix phase of each release cycle (starting with Orchid).
She will also create user stories for teams to do these checks ~1/2 way through each release cycle to get a better idea for what's coming, and identify inter-team dependencies (e.g. for shared libraries, etc.), and help with planning.
I will discuss with the Security Team what guidance and/or tool recommendations we can make to help teams identify dependencies which can be updated... I'm thinking there must be a maven plugin or something for backend... and for frontend something likenpm outdated? We can discuss at our meeting on Thursday.
John Coburn have raised the issue there are so many dependencies which need to be upgraded. All we can do is chip away at this in Orchid and Poppy, the expectation being that we'd be caught up by Quesnellia and from there on it should be more doable to keep dependencies up to date on a per-release basis.
Doing the dependency upgrades in the "bugfix" phase of the release cycle is too late. We need to do this prior to the module release deadline. Craig McNally will circle back with Khalilah on this. Maybe there was a misunderstanding. It seems like we don't have enough time to start doing this work in Orchid. Let's plan it out and give teams a more reasonable amount of time, guidance, etc.
As far as providing guidance to teams...
Julian Ladisch proposed the idea of introducing BOMs for sets of folio dependencies. He will write it up with an example so we can share this with dev teams.
For frontend yarn outdated should do the trick to identify what needs to be updated.
For backend we need to find something that performs the same task (maven plugin?) Craig McNally will investigate and provide options.
Dependabot may be another option. If this is the direction we want to head in, we need to check which repos it's enabled for, etc.
Julian Ladisch will write it up with an example of the BOM for folio dependencies so we can share this with dev teams.
For frontend modules "yarn outdated --all" gives you the complete picture.
Would we be running this at the platform level? Module level? Both?
Dev teams should run this against their own modules
It will also be run at the platform level (by stripes architecture?)
We also have dependabot running in some places - running weekly
How do we prioritize what get's updated?
Dependencies with known vulnerabilities should be updated first
Support periods should be considered as well, but understanding what's supported, for how long may be challenging in itself
It's very difficult to stay on top of all these dependencies, it may not be realistic to expect to be able to update all outdated dependencies each release cycle
This plugin returns a lot of information including potentially unstable versions (release candidates, alphas, etc.) which we don't want teams to upgrade to.
Julian Ladisch will write it up with an example of the BOM and parent dependency for folio dependencies so we can share this with dev teams.
some progress, but not ready to present to security team.
Java: All 38 security hotspots rules and all 53 vulnerabilities rules are enabled (2 deprecated vulnerabilities rules are disabled).
JavaScript: 53 security hotspots rules and all 27 vulnerabilities rules are enabled.
John Coburn will check whether the remaining 2 security hostspots rules should be enabled.
Snyk: Skott Klebe to take a closer look and add ignore where applicable
Today:
What about the OWASP stuff?
1 min
Cumulative upload problem
Team
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Background
Regarding file upload size issues (SeeImage ModifiedFOLIO-3317-Spike - investigate possible file upload vulnerabilityOPEN), let's brainstorm ideas for mitigating the cumulative upload problem, not just the large file upload size problem.
Some APIs are more vulnerable to this than others, such as those not protected by permissions - e.g. mod-login, edge APIs, etc.
Axel provided some background/context. We still need to give this some thought and possibly suggest a solution
Use case 1: Some script unintentionally sends endless data to some API. This is caught by a maximum upload size.
Use case 2: Denial of service. Difficult to address in Okapi. Might be better handled in other tools like nginx or firewalls that can limit requests. Unlikely that a denial of service attack has a valid login / access token.
TODO: For use case 2: Only add documentation that implementers should use an external firewall (or external nginx) to limit requests.
Some investigation is required, let's capture this in a spike (JIRA).
Axel Dörrer to help define this. – Started, not finished yet.
We can review together and find someone to work on this... maybe have a champion on this team work with someone in the Sys-ops SIG/community.
mod-consortia/ui-consortia have been submitted for TC review
This will probably be raised as part of those reviews
Added a comment to the
Jira Legacy
server
System JiraJIRA
serverId
01505d01-b853-3c2e-90f1-ee9b165564fc
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TCR-26
: Security team disagree with breaking the tenant seperation on okapi token level. We would like to encourage an alternative solution on saml or openid techniques which would be less invasive to the current approach.
TC would like to split off the security/token concerns from the module acceptance, will be discussed next Wednesday TC's meeting
Craig McNally to raise this with the TC again and get the ball rolling on discussing the larger topic (e.g. via a subgroup? RFC? something else?)
Will involve Axel and Julian to a subgroup
The TC approved mod-consortia, but also wanted to discuss the concerns raised about tenant isolation and relaxing tenant checks in certain circumstances. The TC plans to discuss on Monday 6/5 11:00 AM ET. → Julian and Axel to join the meeting
Today:
TC discussed on but required more time. A follow-on conversation has been scheduled for
5 min
FOLIO-3535Upgrade bitnami/elasticsearch:7.10.2 in reference and vagrant development boxes
All
Jakub Skoczen to bring this to the devops team asking to bump elasticsearch to a major version in this case
but there is the concern who should responsible to keep these environments up to date and maintain them in general
the devops team is greatly lacking on ressources and can't take the task permanently
Do we need a better time slot for the security team meeting to allow more members to join?
Logging & Personal Data
Craig/Team
A developer recently reached to me asking if the security team or TC has guidance or rules in place for logging of personal data. Someguidelines are documented on the wiki, but I'm wondering if it's worth making some clarifications and creating a draft decision record for the TC to formally endorse
Is this even in our purview? Should we seek input from the Privacy SIG? Should I raise this with the TC first?
Next steps:
For now, put this on hold. See how the Draft DR approach works for the periodic dependency updates (see above). If that goes smoothly, we'll take this on next. Otherwise we'll consider other approaches.