2025-05-01 Meeting notes

Craig McNally

Axel Dörrer 

Chris Rutledge 

Jakub Skoczen 

Skott Klebe 

TC has approved that each //NOSONAR in Java code should trigger a sonar warning. This has been enabled and announced on #folio-development. Other languages don't have @SuppressWarnings and there can continue to use //NOSONAR without a Sonar warning.

• See the Jira for updates.
• Craig McNally to ask Oleksii Petrenko about the timing of the next QCSP (11)
  • Tentatively scheduled for mid-May

AWS SDK has been reverted to 2.29.9, which is 108 releases behind the latest.  

• Message left in MODOAIPMH-611 - Getting issue details... STATUS for Magda/Slava
• Answer: "upgrading the AWS SDK version is quite risky as we’ve frequently encountered issues during such updates", "we don’t have resources to pass oai-pmh test cases one more time"

Anything Urgent?
Review Mike's Kanban board?
Review Security board?
Review labels=security?

Under Review Filter:  Getting issues...

New Board

• Discussed SECURITY-263 - Getting issue details... STATUS and related issues. The existing Jiras ( UXPROD-2843 - Getting issue details... STATUS , MODEXPW-248 - Getting issue details... STATUS , UIORGS-332 - Getting issue details... STATUS ) don't cover all aspects (sftp, ftps, webdav, certificates, ports in firewall, usability). Jens Heinrich will create a Jira listing the options with pros and cons. Need to ask Magda/Firebird to address the issue.
  • Update:  Jira has been created, Jens asked for clarification on a couple things.  See:  MODEXPW-580 - Getting issue details... STATUS
  • Action:  Security team to review Jens Heinrich's slack posts wrt guidance for Thunderjet

Today:

• Craig McNally to ask around for an env hooked up to LDP/MetaDB so we can experiment and try to identify any other security issues in mod-reporting/ui-ldp wrt error responses (stack traces, unsafe HTML, etc.)
  • This functionality is usually tested in a snapshot env, though it isn't clear which one.
  • Bugfest envs are NOT usually hooked up to LDP/MetaDB
  • Craig will continue to try to find an answer... look at testrails to see who is doing this testing and ask them where they are testing it?

From Craig in slack:

I've been in communication with David Crossley, Wayne Schneider, John Malconian and Peter Murray about the issue above.  They apparently didn't have access to these embargoed issues (SysOps and Core Team).  Peter shared this screenshot with me, which doesn't look right.  I'd like to review this at one of our meetings and come up with a list of changes/improvements for Peter to make.  A few ideas off the top of my head:

1. Add descriptions to each of the security groups, like we have for "FOLIO Security Group"
2. Maybe add a new security group and level for FOLIO devops
3. Review membership of each of these groups and remove users no longer on the project
4. Review the Security Level -> Group mappings.  Some of these don't look quite right to me.

• If it makes this easier, we could invite Peter to a meeting so we can see the groups/levels interactively and makes adjustments as we go
• Not exactly this, but related... 
  • Issues submitted to the SECURITY JIRA project should automatically be embargoed (Security Level = Folio Security Group)
  • The submitter of issues to the SECURITY JIRA project should be able to view issues they submit, regardless of their Security Level
  • Email notification sent to the Folio Security Group when an issue is created in the SECURITY Jira project.
• Action:  Craig McNally to setup a meeting with Peter and representatives from the Security Team to work through these things after WOLFcon?  
  • We need to look into how security level configuration works to gain a better understanding of why it behaves the way it does.  
    • Why do we have All Folio Developers in the "Sys Ops and Core Team" security level?

Today:

• (Craig) no progress due to lack of time to spend on this.  Does someone else have time to work through this with Peter?

From slack conversation, I think I've gathered the following:

• In this case (bank account and transit numbers), the information is highly sensitive.  
  • Highly sensitive information should:
    • Be stored in it's own table
    • Accessed via a dedicated API
    • Protected by a dedicated permission
    • Encrypted in the database, not only on disk.  
      • This could mean either:
        • Explicitly encrypting/decrypting in the application layer and storing the encrypted data in postgres
        • Utilizing postgres extensions/modules to encypt certain columns, e.g. via pgcrypto (see https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/encryption-options.html)

Let's review and discuss before providing this feedback to Raman.

Axel Dörrer also suggested that defining classes of sensitivity could help teams determine which techniques are applicable in various situations.  I agree having some general guidelines on this would be helpful.

• regular data
  • low sensitive - permission based on same API
  • high sensitive - permission based on dedicated API

It would probably help to provide concrete examples of data in each class.  This can be a longer term effort, we don't need to sort out all the details today.

Axel Dörrer 

Due to some absences on different reasons the group stalled. Axel will try to reactivate the group.