2025-04-24 Meeting notes

@Craig McNally

@Julian Ladisch 

@Axel Dörrer 

@Ryan Berger 

@Chris Rutledge 

@Jakub Skoczen 

@John Coburn 

@Skott Klebe 

@Kevin Day

@Jens Heinrich

@Tom Gorman 

Will miss meetings on 5/8 through 5/22

5-10 min

Sonarqube

Team

Use of //NOSONAR, etc.  See slack for details.

• Should we re-enable the sonar rule to emit a warning if //NOSONAR is used?

  • Yes - @Julian Ladisch will put this in place

    • Waiting until TC approves.

  • @Craig McNally to mention this at the next TC meeting for approval (and general awareness).

    • Will do on Apr 28, 2025 

1-2 min

Pen Testing

Craig

Just reviewed findings with the pen testers today.  Will be creating SECURITY issues soon.  Sneak preview:

• Username enumeration via "forgot password" / "forgot username" 

• Finish migration away from mod-configuration (even non-sensitive data)

• Stack traces returned from backend modules in some cases

• Reduce superfluous information in responses, e.g. "via: kong/3.7.1", "server: nginx/1.26.2", etc.

?

SECURITY-272: XBOW-025-171 NumberGenerator template arbitrary code execution in mod-service-interactionCompletedPreview

Team

See notes in the JIRA.

@Craig McNally after days finally heard back from Tom Cramer - neither he or Peter M. had responded to XBOW.  I got a response out yesterday and included the security team on the email.

Previous:

• XBOW has filed a private vulnerability report

• Next step is to triage and provide a Folio-specific report with additional details (e.g. the module is behind Okapi, etc.)

• It isn't clear who will do this.. is it the development team or Security Team?

  • Craig has bumped the thread to sort out details (who is doing what, where will the triage doc live, etc.)

Today:

• See the Jira for updates.

• @Craig McNally to ask @Oleksii Petrenko about the timing of the next QCSP (11)

  • Tentatively scheduled for mid-May

OAI-PMH

Julian

AWS SDK has been reverted to 2.29.9, which is 108 releases behind the latest.  

Is there enough time remaining in the Sunflower bugfix period to test the newer version (2.31.27) → Question for Slava/Magda

• If there are problems, we can then revert

• Message left in MODOAIPMH-611: Update dependencies for Sunflower fixing vulnsClosedPreview for Magda/Slava

ERM modules + Stack traces in error responses

Team

Reviewed ERM-3292 and ERM-3466.  Left a comment for Owen/Ethan asking if there is a way to solve this problem for all ERM (grails) modules since it keeps coming up.  Also assigned to Trillium.

*

Anything Urgent?
Review Mike's Kanban board?
Review Security board?
Review labels=security?

Under Review Filter: 

New Board

Team

• Discussed SECURITY-263: CVE-2025-26465 - OpenSSH client VerifyHostKeyDNS MITM - Analysis of vulnerabilityCompletedPreview and related issues. The existing Jiras (UXPROD-2843: Implement secure connection methods for Batch Voucher exportClosedPreview, MODEXPW-248: Implement support of sftp client to login by private key for Edifact Orders ExportIn RefinementPreview, UIORGS-332: Add Private key field for FTP details tab In RefinementPreview) don't cover all aspects (sftp, ftps, webdav, certificates, ports in firewall, usability). @Jens Heinrich will create a Jira listing the options with pros and cons. Need to ask Magda/Firebird to address the issue.

  • Update:  Jira has been created, Jens asked for clarification on a couple things.  See:  MODEXPW-580: Transport Encryption and Validaton thereofOpenPreview

  • Action:  Security team to review @Jens Heinrich's slack posts wrt guidance for Thunderjet

Today:

• @Craig McNally to ask around for an env hooked up to LDP/MetaDB so we can experiment and try to identify any other security issues in mod-reporting/ui-ldp wrt error responses (stack traces, unsafe HTML, etc.)

  • This functionality is usually tested in a snapshot env, though it isn't clear which one.

  • Bugfest envs are NOT usually hooked up to LDP/MetaDB

  • Craig will continue to try to find an answer... look at testrails to see who is doing this testing and ask them where they are testing it?

• @Julian Ladisch to add module specific tickets to https://folio-org.atlassian.net/issues/FOLIO-4283 "Replace net.mguenther.kafka:kafka-junit (EOL)"

  • Done.  Thanks.

0 min

Jira Group and Security Level review

Team

From Craig in slack:

I've been in communication with David Crossley, Wayne Schneider, John Malconian and Peter Murray about the issue above.  They apparently didn't have access to these embargoed issues (SysOps and Core Team).  Peter shared this screenshot with me, which doesn't look right.  I'd like to review this at one of our meetings and come up with a list of changes/improvements for Peter to make.  A few ideas off the top of my head:

1. Add descriptions to each of the security groups, like we have for "FOLIO Security Group"

2. Maybe add a new security group and level for FOLIO devops

3. Review membership of each of these groups and remove users no longer on the project

4. Review the Security Level -> Group mappings.  Some of these don't look quite right to me.

• If it makes this easier, we could invite Peter to a meeting so we can see the groups/levels interactively and makes adjustments as we go

• Not exactly this, but related... 

  • Issues submitted to the SECURITY JIRA project should automatically be embargoed (Security Level = Folio Security Group)

  • The submitter of issues to the SECURITY JIRA project should be able to view issues they submit, regardless of their Security Level

  • Email notification sent to the Folio Security Group when an issue is created in the SECURITY Jira project.

• Action:  @Craig McNally to setup a meeting with Peter and representatives from the Security Team to work through these things after WOLFcon?  

  • We need to look into how security level configuration works to gain a better understanding of why it behaves the way it does.  

    • Why do we have All Folio Developers in the "Sys Ops and Core Team" security level?

Today:

• (Craig) no progress due to lack of time to spend on this.  Does someone else have time to work through this with Peter?

Time permitting

Advice for handling of sensitive banking information

Team

From slack conversation, I think I've gathered the following:

• In this case (bank account and transit numbers), the information is highly sensitive.  

  • Highly sensitive information should:

    • Be stored in it's own table

    • Accessed via a dedicated API

    • Protected by a dedicated permission

    • Encrypted in the database, not only on disk.  

      • This could mean either:

        • Explicitly encrypting/decrypting in the application layer and storing the encrypted data in postgres

        • Utilizing postgres extensions/modules to encypt certain columns, e.g. via pgcrypto (see https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/encryption-options.html)

Let's review and discuss before providing this feedback to Raman.

@Axel Dörrer also suggested that defining classes of sensitivity could help teams determine which techniques are applicable in various situations.  I agree having some general guidelines on this would be helpful.

• regular data

  • low sensitive - permission based on same API

  • high sensitive - permission based on dedicated API

It would probably help to provide concrete examples of data in each class.  This can be a longer term effort, we don't need to sort out all the details today.

• Next Steps:

  • Clearly define/formalize the various classes

    • Come up with concrete examples of each class

    • Build out guidance

      • Come up with concrete examples of how to protect each class of data.

    • Consider storing some classes of data outside of postgres altogether - e.g. in secret storage.

      • What would be the guidance we provide to teams for this so we don't end up with each team doing things differently?

      • SecretStore interface and existing implementations are currently only read-only.  They would need to be extended to allow for creation/mgmt of this information.

    • Craig to start a conversation in slack about this.

      • Seeking a volunteer to generate a draft document for us to review at a later meeting.

Today:

@Axel Dörrer to do a first draft as a base for further discussions

Status on pentesting works within Network traffic control group

@Axel Dörrer 

Due to some absences on different reasons the group stalled. Axel will try to reactivate the group.