2025-03-27 Meeting notes

Craig McNally

Axel Dörrer 

Chris Rutledge 

Jakub Skoczen 

Skott Klebe 

• We should aim for secure by default (opt-out)
• System administrators can set this to a longer value if desired
• The default should remain at 60 minutes
• Craig raised concerns that this is an unexpected change in behavior which could be disruptive
  • a user goes on lunch break and returns to an ended session, losing some unsaved work.
  • data-import/bulk edit jobs running longer than 60 minutes might be affected by this
• We need to make sure that this is effectively communicated in:
  • The Ramsons release notes
  • The docs.folio.org 
  • See STCOR-954 - Getting issue details... STATUS
• We also need to explain the Security Team's position in the #release_bug_triage thread.
• Jens will update the thread.  The issue is already marked as Won't Do.

Today:

• Maybe we should revisit the Idle Session Timeout default value... 60 minutes was chosen arbitrarily
• Keep on the agenda for one more week.  Let's think about a good default value and make a recommendation after our meeting next week.
  • Julian suggests 4 hours is what's used in some other systems.
• Maybe do some research to see what this is usually set to in other systems.
• Needs further discussion  - allocate 10 minutes next week to discuss and decide.

See notes in the JIRA.

Craig McNally after days finally heard back from Tom Cramer - neither he or Peter M. had responded to XBOW.  I got a response out yesterday and included the security team on the email.

Today:

• XBOW has filed a private vulnerability report
• Next step is to triage and provide a Folio-specific report with additional details (e.g. the module is behind Okapi, etc.)
• It isn't clear who will do this.. is it the development team or Security Team?
  • Craig has bumped the thread to sort out details (who is doing what, where will the triage doc live, etc.)

KEYCLOAK-48 - Getting issue details... STATUS

Anything Urgent?
Review Mike's Kanban board?
Review Security board?
Review labels=security?

Under Review Filter:  Getting issues...

New Board

Previous:

• Security board
  • It may be helpful to ask for a new status (similar to "Open") so we can differentiate from "Open" used by dev teams
  • If we want to go this way a request can be made in #olf-infra.
  • We should consider the other option - using two boards:
    • One for SECURITY issues, another for all other issues.
  • Suggestion:  Let's give the two board approach a try, and if we decide it's not working for us, then we can look into the unified board (request a new status, etc.)
• OpenSSH / MitM 
  • SECURITY issue has been created - see SECURITY-263 - Getting issue details... STATUS
  • Need another SECURITY issue to fix the implementation to check the host identity
  • Consider using the new "security preparedness" label.

Today:

• Closed several issues in the "Under Review" column (out of band)
• Discussed SECURITY-263 - Getting issue details... STATUS and related issues. The existing Jiras ( UXPROD-2843 - Getting issue details... STATUS , MODEXPW-248 - Getting issue details... STATUS , UIORGS-332 - Getting issue details... STATUS ) don't cover all aspects (sftp, ftps, webdav, certificates, ports in firewall, usability). Jens Heinrich will create a Jira listing the options with pros and cons. Need to ask Magda/Firebird to address the issue.
  • Update:  Jira has been created, Jens asked for clarification on a couple things.  See:  MODEXPW-580 - Getting issue details... STATUS
• Discussed Keycloak upgrades - closed the related issue about prioritizing these and agreed to ping Eureka/Craig when PRs are raised so speed things along.
• Discussed that the XSS issue in mod-reporting should be backported to Q & R.  Chris Rutledge will reach out to Charlotte/Mike T.
  • Update:  According to Mike T. this may not exploitable via the Folio UI since the HTML is sanitized.  

From Craig in slack:

I've been in communication with David Crossley, Wayne Schneider, John Malconian and Peter Murray about the issue above.  They apparently didn't have access to these embargoed issues (SysOps and Core Team).  Peter shared this screenshot with me, which doesn't look right.  I'd like to review this at one of our meetings and come up with a list of changes/improvements for Peter to make.  A few ideas off the top of my head:

1. Add descriptions to each of the security groups, like we have for "FOLIO Security Group"
2. Maybe add a new security group and level for FOLIO devops
3. Review membership of each of these groups and remove users no longer on the project
4. Review the Security Level -> Group mappings.  Some of these don't look quite right to me.

• If it makes this easier, we could invite Peter to a meeting so we can see the groups/levels interactively and makes adjustments as we go
• Not exactly this, but related... 
  • Issues submitted to the SECURITY JIRA project should automatically be embargoed (Security Level = Folio Security Group)
  • The submitter of issues to the SECURITY JIRA project should be able to view issues they submit, regardless of their Security Level
  • Email notification sent to the Folio Security Group when an issue is created in the SECURITY Jira project.
• Action:  Craig McNally to setup a meeting with Peter and representatives from the Security Team to work through these things after WOLFcon?  
  • We need to look into how security level configuration works to gain a better understanding of why it behaves the way it does.  
    • Why do we have All Folio Developers in the "Sys Ops and Core Team" security level?

Today:

• (Craig) no progress due to lack of time to spend on this.  Does someone else have time to work through this with Peter?

From slack conversation, I think I've gathered the following:

• In this case (bank account and transit numbers), the information is highly sensitive.  
  • Highly sensitive information should:
    • Be stored in it's own table
    • Accessed via a dedicated API
    • Protected by a dedicated permission
    • Encrypted in the database, not only on disk.  
      • This could mean either:
        • Explicitly encrypting/decrypting in the application layer and storing the encrypted data in postgres
        • Utilizing postgres extensions/modules to encypt certain columns, e.g. via pgcrypto (see https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/encryption-options.html)

Let's review and discuss before providing this feedback to Raman.

Axel Dörrer also suggested that defining classes of sensitivity could help teams determine which techniques are applicable in various situations.  I agree having some general guidelines on this would be helpful.

• regular data
  • low sensitive - permission based on same API
  • high sensitive - permission based on dedicated API

It would probably help to provide concrete examples of data in each class.  This can be a longer term effort, we don't need to sort out all the details today.

Axel Dörrer 

Due to some absences on different reasons the group stalled. Axel will try to reactivate the group.