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2025-07-24 Meeting notes

2025-07-24 Meeting notes

Date

Jul 24, 2025

Attendees

Name

Present

Planned Absences

Name

Present

Planned Absences

@Craig McNally

Y

 

@Julian Ladisch 

Y

 

@Axel Dörrer 

 

 

@Ryan Berger (Deactivated) 

Y

 

@Chris Rutledge 

Y

 

@Jakub Skoczen 

 

 

@John Coburn 

Y

 

@Skott Klebe 

 

 

@Kevin Day

 

 

@Jens Heinrich

Y

 

@Tom Gorman 

 

 

Discussion items

Time

Item

Who

Notes

Time

Item

Who

Notes

1 min

https://semgrep.dev/

@Julian Ladisch

Update yarn.lock to pacify snyk? https://open-libr-foundation.slack.com/archives/CAN13SWBF/p1752866755366089

5-10 min

Snyk Vulnerability Stats

@Craig McNally

3 critical issues:

  • jest-config-stripes – https://github.com/folio-org/jest-config-stripes/pull/24

    • the 2 critical issues in pbkdf2 (and the 1 high issue in tar-fs) get fixed by updating yarn.lock.

  • web-toolkit-ce – The development team want to bump the versions in the modules, not in this library. Should Julian remove this module from folio-org’s snyk?

high severity issues:

commons-lang/commons-lang3 is a very frequently used Java library. This issue https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/SECURITY-327 causes Snyk to report a vulnerability for most Java based modules.

And there are several new issues in Spring affecting most Spring based modules:

5 min

https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/MODLOGIN-164

All

Notes:

  • We decided to bump this to P2 and ask the core platform team to work on it.

  • For consistency, it should be backported to Sunflower and Ramsons

*

Anything Urgent?
Review Security board?
Review labels=security?
Issues under review?

Under Review Filter:
https://folio-org.atlassian.net/issues/?jql=project%20in%20(SECURITY)%20and%20status%20in%20(%22Under%20Review%22)%20ORDER%20BY%20created%20DESC

Team

We need a volunteer to help mark issues ignored in Snyk as we close them as won’t do. Please help out if you have a few moments!

See the list of issue closed as “Won’t Do” here:

Topic Backlog

0 min

Jira Group and Security Level review

Team

From Craig in slack:

I've been in communication with David Crossley, Wayne Schneider, John Malconian and Peter Murray about the issue above.  They apparently didn't have access to these embargoed issues (SysOps and Core Team).  Peter shared this screenshot with me, which doesn't look right.  I'd like to review this at one of our meetings and come up with a list of changes/improvements for Peter to make.  A few ideas off the top of my head:

  1. Add descriptions to each of the security groups, like we have for "FOLIO Security Group"

  2. Maybe add a new security group and level for FOLIO devops

  3. Review membership of each of these groups and remove users no longer on the project

  4. Review the Security Level -> Group mappings.  Some of these don't look quite right to me.

  • If it makes this easier, we could invite Peter to a meeting so we can see the groups/levels interactively and makes adjustments as we go

  • Not exactly this, but related... 

    • Issues submitted to the SECURITY JIRA project should automatically be embargoed (Security Level = Folio Security Group)

    • The submitter of issues to the SECURITY JIRA project should be able to view issues they submit, regardless of their Security Level

    • Email notification sent to the Folio Security Group when an issue is created in the SECURITY Jira project.

  • Action:  @Craig McNally to setup a meeting with Peter and representatives from the Security Team to work through these things after WOLFcon?  

    • We need to look into how security level configuration works to gain a better understanding of why it behaves the way it does.  

      • Why do we have All Folio Developers in the "Sys Ops and Core Team" security level?

Today:

  • (Craig) no progress due to lack of time to spend on this.  Does someone else have time to work through this with Peter?

Time permitting

Advice for handling of sensitive banking information

Team

From slack conversation, I think I've gathered the following:

  • In this case (bank account and transit numbers), the information is highly sensitive.  

    • Highly sensitive information should:

      • Be stored in it's own table

      • Accessed via a dedicated API

      • Protected by a dedicated permission

      • Encrypted in the database, not only on disk.  

Let's review and discuss before providing this feedback to Raman.

@Axel Dörrer also suggested that defining classes of sensitivity could help teams determine which techniques are applicable in various situations.  I agree having some general guidelines on this would be helpful.

  • regular data

    • low sensitive - permission based on same API

    • high sensitive - permission based on dedicated API

It would probably help to provide concrete examples of data in each class.  This can be a longer term effort, we don't need to sort out all the details today.

  • Next Steps:

    • Clearly define/formalize the various classes

      • Come up with concrete examples of each class

      • Build out guidance

        • Come up with concrete examples of how to protect each class of data.

      • Consider storing some classes of data outside of postgres altogether - e.g. in secret storage.

        • What would be the guidance we provide to teams for this so we don't end up with each team doing things differently?

        • SecretStore interface and existing implementations are currently only read-only.  They would need to be extended to allow for creation/mgmt of this information.

      • Craig to start a conversation in slack about this.

        • Seeking a volunteer to generate a draft document for us to review at a later meeting.

Today:

@Axel Dörrer to do a first draft as a base for further discussions



Status on pentesting works within Network traffic control group

@Axel Dörrer 

Due to some absences on different reasons the group stalled. Axel will try to reactivate the group.

 

SFTP

 

https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/MODEXPW-248

https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/UIORGS-332

Action items