@Craig McNally

7/3

@Julian Ladisch 

7/3

@Axel Dörrer 

@Ryan Berger (Deactivated) 

7/3

@Chris Rutledge 

@Jakub Skoczen 

@John Coburn 

7/3

@Skott Klebe 

7/3

@Kevin Day

@Jens Heinrich

@Tom Gorman 

7/3

< 5 min

Check-in on last/next week’s meetings

All

Did we meet last week given the number of people absent?

Should we cancel next week due to holiday?

1 min

https://semgrep.dev/

@Julian Ladisch

We should give it a try - free for public repos.

@Julian Ladisch will reach out to Peter M. to get it setup: https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/FOLIO-4291

• You can join the https://semgrep.dev/orgs/semgrep_folio_org if you are a member of https://github.com/orgs/folio-org/people

• Let's all get familiar with this tool, so far it's looking great

• Kevin played around with it, and was pleasantly surprised.  It found errors which he wasn't expecting it to, docker yaml files, github actions, etc.

• Also references 3rd party documentation (helpful!)

Today:

• So far, so good. Let’s keep semgrep in place and remove this from the agenda going forward.

0 min

CQL & wildcards

https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/UIU-2882

Julian/Team

See slack (#folio-security-group) for context.

• Is this actually a security issue?

• Let's circle back on this when Julian is present and make a final decision on how to proceed.

• No response from Ameila Sutton on this.

• Looks like this has been pulled into sprint 219.  Let's see if Volaris does the work, or if we need to push harder.

Today:

• Done. Can remove from upcoming agendas

5 min

https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/MODLOGIN-164

All

Message from @Julian Ladisch in slack…

The user enumeration issue got fixed for Eureka: https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/MODUSERSKC-83
For Okapi-based installations we have https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/MODLOGIN-164 "Login allows username and password enumeration" with priority P3 that doesn't allow a CSP. Fixing it requires a breaking change as the response will be a general message (login failed) without explaining the reason. Source code: mod-login/src/main/java/org/folio/rest/impl/LoginAPI.java at v7.13.0 · folio-org/mod-login
If you agree that it is still P3 the we should close it as Won't do.

Let’s discuss and make a decision.

Notes:

• We decided to bump this to P2 and ask the team to work on it.

• For consistency, it should be backported to Sunflower and Ramsons

5 min

TC: Evaluate existing modules

All

TC wants to evaluate existing modules (not only new modules): https://folio-org.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/TC/pages/1078165516/2025-06-25+Evaluating+Existing+Modules

This will probably include security smells reported by sonar: https://sonarcloud.io/organizations/folio-org/projects

*

Anything Urgent?
Review Mike's Kanban board?
Review Security board?
Review labels=security?

Under Review Filter: https://folio-org.atlassian.net/issues/?jql=filter%3D12879+

New Board

Team

Previous: 

• Discussed https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/SECURITY-263 and related issues. The existing Jiras (https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/UXPROD-2843, https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/MODEXPW-248, https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/UIORGS-332) don't cover all aspects (sftp, ftps, webdav, certificates, ports in firewall, usability). @Jens Heinrich will create a Jira listing the options with pros and cons. Need to ask Magda/Firebird to address the issue.

  • Update:  Jira has been created, Jens asked for clarification on a couple things.  See:  https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/MODEXPW-580

  • Action:  Security team to review @Jens Heinrich's slack posts wrt guidance for Thunderjet

• Reviewed Critical and High severity issues created today from the latest PRISMA scan.

  • SECURITY-298 - SECURITY-309

  • We did not get to the Medium/Low ones.

Today:

0 min

Jira Group and Security Level review

Team

From Craig in slack:

I've been in communication with David Crossley, Wayne Schneider, John Malconian and Peter Murray about the issue above.  They apparently didn't have access to these embargoed issues (SysOps and Core Team).  Peter shared this screenshot with me, which doesn't look right.  I'd like to review this at one of our meetings and come up with a list of changes/improvements for Peter to make.  A few ideas off the top of my head:

1. Add descriptions to each of the security groups, like we have for "FOLIO Security Group"

2. Maybe add a new security group and level for FOLIO devops

3. Review membership of each of these groups and remove users no longer on the project

4. Review the Security Level -> Group mappings.  Some of these don't look quite right to me.

• If it makes this easier, we could invite Peter to a meeting so we can see the groups/levels interactively and makes adjustments as we go

• Not exactly this, but related... 

  • Issues submitted to the SECURITY JIRA project should automatically be embargoed (Security Level = Folio Security Group)

  • The submitter of issues to the SECURITY JIRA project should be able to view issues they submit, regardless of their Security Level

  • Email notification sent to the Folio Security Group when an issue is created in the SECURITY Jira project.

• Action:  @Craig McNally to setup a meeting with Peter and representatives from the Security Team to work through these things after WOLFcon?  

  • We need to look into how security level configuration works to gain a better understanding of why it behaves the way it does.  

    • Why do we have All Folio Developers in the "Sys Ops and Core Team" security level?

Today:

• (Craig) no progress due to lack of time to spend on this.  Does someone else have time to work through this with Peter?

Time permitting

Advice for handling of sensitive banking information

Team

From slack conversation, I think I've gathered the following:

• In this case (bank account and transit numbers), the information is highly sensitive.  

  • Highly sensitive information should:

    • Be stored in it's own table

    • Accessed via a dedicated API

    • Protected by a dedicated permission

    • Encrypted in the database, not only on disk.  

      • This could mean either:

        • Explicitly encrypting/decrypting in the application layer and storing the encrypted data in postgres

        • Utilizing postgres extensions/modules to encypt certain columns, e.g. via pgcrypto (see https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/encryption-options.html)

Let's review and discuss before providing this feedback to Raman.

@Axel Dörrer also suggested that defining classes of sensitivity could help teams determine which techniques are applicable in various situations.  I agree having some general guidelines on this would be helpful.

• regular data

  • low sensitive - permission based on same API

  • high sensitive - permission based on dedicated API

It would probably help to provide concrete examples of data in each class.  This can be a longer term effort, we don't need to sort out all the details today.

• Next Steps:

  • Clearly define/formalize the various classes

    • Come up with concrete examples of each class

    • Build out guidance

      • Come up with concrete examples of how to protect each class of data.

    • Consider storing some classes of data outside of postgres altogether - e.g. in secret storage.

      • What would be the guidance we provide to teams for this so we don't end up with each team doing things differently?

      • SecretStore interface and existing implementations are currently only read-only.  They would need to be extended to allow for creation/mgmt of this information.

    • Craig to start a conversation in slack about this.

      • Seeking a volunteer to generate a draft document for us to review at a later meeting.

Today:

@Axel Dörrer to do a first draft as a base for further discussions

Status on pentesting works within Network traffic control group

@Axel Dörrer 

Due to some absences on different reasons the group stalled. Axel will try to reactivate the group.