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2025-06-05 Meeting notes

2025-06-05 Meeting notes

Jun 05, 2025

Date

Jun 5, 2025

Attendees

Name

Present

Planned Absences

Name

Present

Planned Absences

@Craig McNally

Yes

 

@Julian Ladisch 

Yes

 

@Axel Dörrer 

 

 

@Ryan Berger (Deactivated) 

Yes

 

@Chris Rutledge 

 

 

@Jakub Skoczen 

 

 

@John Coburn 

 

 

@Skott Klebe 

 

 

@Kevin Day

Yes

 

@Jens Heinrich

 

 

@Tom Gorman 

 

 

Discussion items

Time

Item

Who

Notes

Time

Item

Who

Notes

1 min

https://semgrep.dev/

@Julian Ladisch

We should give it a try - free for public repos.

@Julian Ladisch will reach out to Peter M. to get it setup: https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/FOLIO-4291

Today:

1 min

https://folio-org.atlassian.net/browse/SECURITY-272

Team

  • See the Jira for updates.

  • Quesnelia CSP #11 has been released today. Julian has asked the repository owners to publish the advisory (at least one of the owners is out and will be back on Tuesday).

  • When the advisory is public Julian will add the Jira to the release notes of Ramsons CSP#1 and Quesnelia CSP#11, and announce it in the slack channels.

  • This is done.  Can be removed from the agenda next week.

?

CQL & wildcards

Julian/Team

See slack (#folio-security-group) for context.

  • Is this actually a security issue?

  • Let's circle back on this when Julian is present and make a final decision on how to proceed.

  • No response from Ameila Sutton on this.

  • Looks like this has been pulled into sprint 219.  Let's see if Volaris does the work, or if we need to push harder.

*

Anything Urgent?
Review Mike's Kanban board?
Review Security board?
Review labels=security?

Under Review Filter: https://folio-org.atlassian.net/issues/?jql=filter%3D12879+

New Board

Team

Previous: 

Today:

  • Reviewed Critical and High severity issues created today from the latest PRISMA scan.

    • SECURITY-298 - SECURITY-309

    • We did not get to the Medium/Low ones.

Topic Backlog

0 min

Jira Group and Security Level review

Team

From Craig in slack:

I've been in communication with David Crossley, Wayne Schneider, John Malconian and Peter Murray about the issue above.  They apparently didn't have access to these embargoed issues (SysOps and Core Team).  Peter shared this screenshot with me, which doesn't look right.  I'd like to review this at one of our meetings and come up with a list of changes/improvements for Peter to make.  A few ideas off the top of my head:

  1. Add descriptions to each of the security groups, like we have for "FOLIO Security Group"

  2. Maybe add a new security group and level for FOLIO devops

  3. Review membership of each of these groups and remove users no longer on the project

  4. Review the Security Level -> Group mappings.  Some of these don't look quite right to me.

  • If it makes this easier, we could invite Peter to a meeting so we can see the groups/levels interactively and makes adjustments as we go

  • Not exactly this, but related... 

    • Issues submitted to the SECURITY JIRA project should automatically be embargoed (Security Level = Folio Security Group)

    • The submitter of issues to the SECURITY JIRA project should be able to view issues they submit, regardless of their Security Level

    • Email notification sent to the Folio Security Group when an issue is created in the SECURITY Jira project.

  • Action:  @Craig McNally to setup a meeting with Peter and representatives from the Security Team to work through these things after WOLFcon?  

    • We need to look into how security level configuration works to gain a better understanding of why it behaves the way it does.  

      • Why do we have All Folio Developers in the "Sys Ops and Core Team" security level?

Today:

  • (Craig) no progress due to lack of time to spend on this.  Does someone else have time to work through this with Peter?

Time permitting

Advice for handling of sensitive banking information

Team

From slack conversation, I think I've gathered the following:

  • In this case (bank account and transit numbers), the information is highly sensitive.  

    • Highly sensitive information should:

      • Be stored in it's own table

      • Accessed via a dedicated API

      • Protected by a dedicated permission

      • Encrypted in the database, not only on disk.  

Let's review and discuss before providing this feedback to Raman.

@Axel Dörrer also suggested that defining classes of sensitivity could help teams determine which techniques are applicable in various situations.  I agree having some general guidelines on this would be helpful.

  • regular data

    • low sensitive - permission based on same API

    • high sensitive - permission based on dedicated API

It would probably help to provide concrete examples of data in each class.  This can be a longer term effort, we don't need to sort out all the details today.

  • Next Steps:

    • Clearly define/formalize the various classes

      • Come up with concrete examples of each class

      • Build out guidance

        • Come up with concrete examples of how to protect each class of data.

      • Consider storing some classes of data outside of postgres altogether - e.g. in secret storage.

        • What would be the guidance we provide to teams for this so we don't end up with each team doing things differently?

        • SecretStore interface and existing implementations are currently only read-only.  They would need to be extended to allow for creation/mgmt of this information.

      • Craig to start a conversation in slack about this.

        • Seeking a volunteer to generate a draft document for us to review at a later meeting.

Today:

@Axel Dörrer to do a first draft as a base for further discussions

 

Status on pentesting works within Network traffic control group

@Axel Dörrer 

Due to some absences on different reasons the group stalled. Axel will try to reactivate the group.

Action items